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Nearly two decades ago, Jason Shogren spoke at 
the Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Eco-
nomics Association (NAREA) annual meeting 
about how the burgeoning field of experimental 
economics might be useful in addressing ques-
tions of interest to environmental and resource 
economists (Shogren 1993). At the time he spoke, 
in 1992, experimental economics was a niche field 
that primarily focused on nonmarket valuation 
techniques, social dilemma games, bargaining ex-
periments, and testing game-theoretic models. As 
demonstrated in this special issue of the Agricul-
tural and Resource Economics Review ( ARER), 
things have certainly changed in ways that would 
have been hard to predict two decades ago, in-
cluding the 2002 Nobel Prize awarded to Vernon 
Smith, the 2009 Nobel Prize awarded to Elinor 
Ostrom, publication of a field journal dedicated to 
experimental economics, and significant expan-
sion in the range of topics and methodological 
approaches. 
  The changes that have occurred during the 
field’s rapid growth, which started in the mid-
1990s and continues today, are evident in this 
issue’s 14 papers that were written by 40 re-
searchers from 27 institutions located in 9 coun-
tries on 5 continents. This special issue of ARER 
features primarily the papers presented at a meth-
ods workshop that sought to introduce young 
scholars to experimental economics techniques 
and to showcase examples of high quality re-
search that addressed environmental, natural re-
source, and agricultural economics issues. Tim 
Cason and Shogren, two leaders in the field, de-
livered invited presentations. This workshop, which 
followed the NAREA annual conference, was held 
in Burlington, Vermont, on June 9th and 10th, 
2009. Financial support for the workshop and for 
publication of these papers in ARER was provided 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Farm Foundation, and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Economic Research Service. 
  The papers in this special issue not only con-
tribute to the classic experimental economics lit-
erature, but also illustrate how far the field has 
grown since the early 1990s. The papers cover a 
wide range of topics, from emissions auctions 
under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(Shobe et al. 2010) to managing a multispecies 
fishery (Anderson 2010), and use a variety of 
methods, including traditional laboratory experi-
ments, field experiments, and hybrid approaches, 
such as Knapp and Murphy’s (2010) field-in-the-
lab approach. What is common in these studies is 
the use of what Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson 
(2010) refer to as an experimental “mindset” which 
seeks to better understand the behavior of indivi-
duals, businesses, and organizations within the 
context of various institutional settings. 
  Shogren, invited to return as a keynote speaker 
for this workshop, notes how experimental meth-
ods have expanded from controlled laboratory 
settings with undergraduate students to include 
field experiments, neuroeconomics, and virtual 
reality. He discusses how behavioral economics 
has grown as a field and is now not only chal-
lenging parts of the traditional rational choice 
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framework, but is also influencing economic poli-
cymakers at the highest levels. In addition to this 
methodological growth, the application of experi-
mental methods to environmental and natural re-
source issues also underwent significant expan-
sion in the mid- to late 1990s. Shogren’s 1992 
talk roughly coincided with two significant events 
in environmental policy that helped broaden ex-
perimental research to include more applied 
policy issues. The 1989 Exxon Valdez spill sub-
stantially expanded the existing literature on non-
market valuation techniques, particularly regard-
ing hypothetical bias and the development of cali-
bration techniques to mitigate its effects. A key 
component of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments was the implementation of the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s sulfur dioxide 
emissions trading program, one of the world’s 
first successful large-scale cap-and-trade pro-
grams, leading to a surge in experimental research 
related to the design of emissions trading pro-
grams and, more broadly, on laboratory “testbed-
ding” of new environmental policy initiatives. 
Testbedding of policies using experimental eco-
nomics has been compared to using wind tunnels 
to test airplane design (Shogren 2004). 
  The workshop’s other keynote speaker, Cason 
(2010), highlighted the growth in the use of ex-
periments as testbeds for policy. Economics ex-
periments are now providing valuable input into a 
wide variety of environmental, natural resource, 
and agricultural policy questions. Cason has been 
a major contributor to the emissions trading ex-
perimental literature, and his paper in this issue 
provides an excellent overview. Emission trading 
institutions, in particular, have received renewed 
research focus as a result of interest in the devel-
opment of markets for a variety of environmental 
services, such as greenhouse gas emissions. 
  Both Cason’s and Shogren’s talks touched upon 
a theme that frequently emerged throughout the 
workshop and is a hot topic within the field of 
experimental economics: the relative merits of 
laboratory and field experiments. Around the late 
1990s the landscape of experimental economics 
underwent a significant expansion with respect to 
both the range of topics studied and the 
experimental methods used. Until this time, the 
overwhelming majority of experiments were 
conducted in laboratory settings with university 
students. There was a natural progression with a 
significant surge in field studies using non-stu-
dent subject pools.
1 Joe Henrich (2000) was con-
ducting field experiments with indigenous com-
munities in Peru that laid the foundation for the 
15 societies study that integrated ethnographic 
and experimental research in a cross-cultural com-
parison (Henrich et al. 2004). John List was con-
currently working with sportscard dealers and 
found that experience matters in market exchange 
environments (List and Lucking-Reiley 2000). 
  The participants in Juan Camilo Cardenas’ field 
experiments were rural villagers in Colombia whose 
livelihood depended upon successful management 
of a common pool resource. At the time, most ex-
periments used neutral, context-free language to 
provide more experiment control. As Cason notes 
in this issue, the rationale for neutral framing was 
to reduce the likelihood that providing a context 
might unintentionally invoke certain preferences 
that the experimenter cannot observe. Cardenas 
was concerned that, in the absence of a context, 
subjects would introduce their own unobservable 
context, leading to less control. He argued that 
these villagers might bring a set of experiences 
and information about the context in a social di-
lemma that was quite different from that of uni-
versity students (e.g., Cardenas and Ostrom 2004). 
  This special issue features two field experi-
ments conducted in developing nations. Alevy, 
Cristi, and Melo (2010) worked with Chilean 
farmers to test the properties of a right-to-choose 
auction. Prior to the experiment, the research 
team acquired actual water volumes that were 
then offered for sale to farmers in two different 
auctions. Similar to Cardenas’ experiments, the 
commodity being auctioned (water) is essential 
for the subjects’ livelihoods and the experiments 
were framed using a context that was already 
familiar to the subjects. Their results suggest that 
the right-to-choose auction raises more revenue 
than a sequential auction and that varying risk 
attitudes can explain much of the difference in 
bidding behaviors observed. The paper by Lyb-
bert et al. (2010) has a development focus. The 
authors note that their framed field experiments in 
Morocco, Peru, and Kenya not only offer benefits 
to researchers seeking to understand how the poor 
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respond to risk and to complex products, such as 
index insurance, but also provide an educational 
benefit by helping low-income farmers under-
stand complex stochastic, dynamic processes. 
  Cason’s (2010) paper discusses the merits of 
lab experiments, including the testbedding of 
proposed new rules and institutions, which is a 
focus of several papers in this special issue. For 
instance, Anderson (2010) tests a points-based 
system for managing the Northeast Multispecies 
Fishery that was proposed by an industry group. 
The experimental results show that harvesters are 
broadly responsive to this system of point prices, 
especially those with experience. Anderson con-
cludes by suggesting that this type of system 
could be used to effectively manage a multispe-
cies fishery to ensure acceptable economic and 
biological outcomes, assuming that the point 
prices can be readily adjusted over time. Doyon, 
Rondeau, and Mbala (2010) test new auction 
mechanisms for tradable egg production quotas in 
Quebec. They show that in thin markets, such as 
those common in highly concentrated agricultural 
industries, the truncated k-double auction can 
help decrease equilibrium prices with only mod-
erate efficiency losses, thereby helping counter 
potential market power from oligopolies. Shobe 
et al. (2010) focus their use of experimental auc-
tions to examine issues related to the direct sale 
of carbon emissions in the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative. Their paper tests the effects of 
“loose” and “strict” caps on the allocated allow-
ances based on recent emission history. Their re-
sults suggest that auction revenue is lower com-
pared to competitive benchmarks when a loose 
cap is used, but that these differences in revenue 
dissipate after a series of auctions. 
  Other papers are motivated by contemporary 
policy issues even if not directly testing alterna-
tive policy instruments. Hellerstein and Higgins 
(2010) use the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Conservation Reserve Program as the basis for 
their land conservation auction experiments. Their 
experimental results show that while capping the 
maximum amount a landowner can receive in 
environmental markets may have intuitive appeal 
as a way of reducing government expenditures, 
these caps actually can lead to an increase in ex-
penditures. The authors argue that relaxing re-
strictions on the maximum bids from landowners 
could yield better results, especially when the 
quality of the land enrolled in the program mat-
ters. Knapp and Murphy’s (2010) study of rent 
dissipation in competitive fisheries is motivated 
by the challenges faced in the Bristol Bay Alaska 
salmon fishery. They use a novel, interactive ex-
periment that “brings the field into the lab.” The 
task for subjects in their lab experiment was com-
parable to the field task under investigation—
actively harvesting from a limited resource stock. 
Subjects had to decide which harvesting device 
(measuring cups) to purchase, each of which had 
different harvesting capacities (cup size) and ac-
quisition costs. The harvesting devices were then 
used to extract valuable items (dry beans) from a 
common pool resource (a large bowl). Bernard 
and He (2010) examine how bidding behavior in 
lab experiments involving the purchase of food 
might be influenced before and after a large in-
crease in the prices for these goods in the field. 
Their results support the growing literature that 
suggests that researchers should be conscious of 
how field prices affect willingness-to-pay bids in 
experiments. 
  Other studies in this issue have policy implica-
tions, but the motivation is more general. For in-
stance, Spraggon and Oxoby (2010) add to the 
nonpoint source pollution literature by evaluating 
how recommendations about choices and the 
presentation of payoff information might affect 
behavior. Their study suggests that the ambient-
based policy instruments can be significantly im-
proved when decision errors are reduced by pro-
viding a more robust description of the decision 
environment. Giordana, Montginoul, and Willin-
ger (2010) investigate the relationship between 
static and dynamic externalities in a common pool 
resource, which is a critical issue in managing 
groundwater extraction from coastal aquifers where 
overexploitation can lead to irreversible damage 
from seawater intrusion. The results of their ex-
periments did not support their initial hypothesis 
that the existence of static externalities would 
lead subjects to exhibit more pro-social behavior. 
Kotani, Messer, and Schulze (2010) use experi-
ments to examine how changes in the incentive 
structure of tax refund and matching grant mecha-
nisms leads to different levels of voluntary contri-
butions to public goods. These authors argue that 
the “helping hand” that subjects provide through 
their contributions in settings that are not incen-
tive-compatible reflect a partial revelation of de-vi    April 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
mand for the good in question and therefore should 
be accounted for in benefit-cost analyses related 
to environmental projects. 
  Two studies address issues related to nonmar-
ket valuation. Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson 
(2010) note in their paper that for controversial 
goods individuals may have either positive or 
negative values, and they study this within the 
context of willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept auctions. The authors conclude by express-
ing concerns that for controversial goods, the 
existence of positive and negative values could 
result in an overstatement of the costs relative to 
the benefits. Caplan, Aadland, and Macharia’s 
(2010) research finds hypothetical bias in stated-
preference public goods experiments in Bot-
swana. Although there is an abundance of hypo-
thetical bias studies, this study is one of the few 
that investigates this issue in a developing nation. 
  In summary, this special issue illustrates the 
breadth of current application of experimental 
economics techniques to issues of importance to 
environmental, resource, and agricultural eco-
nomics. As Shogren departed from the workshop, 
he reported what a pleasure it was to see how the 
“seeds” that the pioneers of experimental eco-
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